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Abstract: The paper describes how complex co-ownership issues arising from estate-distribution can lead to
uneconomic farm sizes or sometimes prevent farming activities altogether (through land-use conversion or land
abandonment). Muslims in Malaysia rely almost exclusively on Fara’id laws in which ownership of all the
deceased’s  assets,  including  land, are apportioned to his beneficiaries. The interaction between the
religiously-prescribed estate-distribution methods and the British-introduced land administration system may
have indirectly contributed to undervaluation and fragmentation of rural land, mostly owned by Malay
households. In the short run, the adverse effects can be seen in the uneconomic farm sizes and eventual
conversion of farmland to other uses. In the long run, the trends may erode food production capabilities of the
country as well as the Malay-Muslim total land holdings and therefore their economic wealth. Empirical
evidence showed that paddy and vacant land, two types of land typically associated with Malays in Malaysia,
are indeed valued lower than like-to-like land parcels in other categories. It is hoped that the paper can trigger
more in-depth research to better public awareness and inform policy-improvement measures by the present
land-related agencies and Muslim affairs authorities.
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INTRODUCTION using  land  only  for  subsistence  farming and dwelling.
Legal reforms brought by the British administration very  likely  that  the  land,  being the only substantial
in respect to land administration left a profound effect on asset  to be distributed, would be divided into even
the way land in Malaysia is used and distributed. Prior to smaller sizes to be given to his beneficiaries. In the
this, individuals or groups in the Malay-Muslim Malaysian land registration system, it is entirely possible
community are only able to acquire usufruct, i.e., rights to to register more than one individual as co-owners of any
use, of a property (land). The Torrens land titling system, given land parcel. Many families adopt Shari’ah’s
introduced in 1896, however, gives a person indefeasible prescriptions for guidance regarding asset-division
claim, including conveyancing rights, to a specific piece proportions and beneficiaries, especially if the deceased
of land upon registration of his or her name on the land’s died intestate and there is no alternative and mutually
title. This change in the grounds of ownership from agreed scheme of distribution. Indeed Islam offers an
usufruct to title registration in no small measure lead to astoundingly clear, refined and structured method of
the emergence of speculative motives in holding land, a estate distribution through Surah An-Nisaa verses 11 -13
concept which was previously non-existent in the as  the basis  of its Fara’id law of inheritance. With
traditional Malay-Muslim worldview [1]. respect to land, no single person can take full ownership
When land titling was first introduced, the peasant of the land until others have renounced their rights to
Malays were asked to register the land they were utilizing their own shares voluntarily or in exchange of other
during the time. Naturally the initial sizes of these assets or payments (buy out the others’ shares in the
holdings were small, given that Malays were typically land) [2-10].
It follows that upon death of its owner, where it was also
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From a purely economics point of view, how do land fragmentation and therefore, land values, in the
estate-distribution issues affect market for land, context of Malaysia. Muslim estate distribution examples
specifically, agricultural land? As land is passed down are given  in  light of Fara’id and National Land Code
from one generation to another, the process of land (NLC, 1965) provisions. Section III describes the empirical
fragmentation takes place continuously partly due to model and assumptions used to shed light on price
estate-distribution decisions. Fragmentation of Muslim differentials of various types of land including ones that
landholdings remains a major economic concern typifies Malay rural landholdings while Section IV
throughout the country’s history and is often blamed for provides  some  points  to  ponder  and  final  summary
unsuccessful revival of the agricultural sector. The 1960 [10-17].
Agricultural Census shows that 59 percent of all farms
were less than 4 acres, while over 90 percent were less Land Co-Ownership Through Estate-Distribution: The
than 10 acres. It is worse in the paddy sub-sector where Malaysian National Land Code (NLC) (1965) allows land
54 percent of the holdings were less than 2.75 acres while partitioning as a possible way out of co-ownership ties.
97 percent were less than 10 acres. Today, land However, the inconvenience of negotiations and
fragmentation is one of the causes for the country’s large bureaucracy are often daunting in costs and time and
numbers of unsold and unutilized inherited land. As at individuals involved also need to deal with the sensitivity
1981, the Ministry of Agriculture identified 890,000 of death and family relations. Furthermore, all co-owners
hectares of abandoned agricultural land and of that must agree to the partition at the same time. Due to this
amount, 18% was paddy land (Sahak, 1987). More radical and a host of other factors, it is not uncommon to find
figures  have been quoted about the real extent of the land land  distribution  cases  go  on  unresolved for decades.
abandonment in Malaysia. In an article published in 1995, In the event that one of the beneficiaries passes away
the Director-General of Forest Research Institute of before the process is completed, then his or her
Malaysia estimated that 3 million hectares of farmland are beneficiaries is automatically added to the existing list of
not effectively cultivated (New Straits Times, 3 January “co-owners”, although their collective share is limited to
1995). By January 2007, unclaimed properties and land what  is  claimable  by  the  individual they inherit from.
valued at a total of RM330 million and approximately The number of co-owners can indeed multiply before a
1,000,000 land titles had not been transferred to the complete solution is executed, causing even more
rightful beneficiaries either because they cannot be traced difficulty in negotiation and procedural matters. The
or they cannot agree to the proposed estate-distribution Malaysian law gives equal recognition to all co-owners,
scheme (Amanah Raya Berhad, 2008). The 9  Malaysia unlike the British land registration system which allows upth
Plan (p.85) reports the existence of 163,000 hectares of idle to a maximum of four people to have registered ownership
land from the period of 2001 to 2005. In the 10th Malaysia interest in the land.
plan, no official statistics were released but the One   possible   strategy   to   avoid  protracted
government stated that it is acutely aware of the scarcity estate-distribution process is to set up a firm to manage
of suitable  farmland  for food production yet no new the  land  whereby the beneficiaries’ interests are
paddy-growing  area  is  to  be  opened  (Malaysia, 2011, translated as equity in the firm. However, this option is
p. 137). economically worthwhile only if the land is sufficiently
To the best of our knowledge, there has been no large  and  highly  productive.   For   smaller   holdings,
empirical study that links the market value of land to the co-owners often resort to selling the land (in return for
nature  of  land’s  ownership i.e. co-owned through cash inheritance) or apply for  the  land  to be partitioned.
estate-distribution of the deceased or owned by single Through the latter, each co-owner can independently
entity. Data on exact ownership status of any given land decide what to do with the land since they now obtain full
is not available through secondary data sources, yet it is rights on their respective portions of the land, subject to
still possible to make inferences about the market for certain restrictions. 
Malay-owned smallholdings through other means. For the Transmission of land via estate distribution process
purpose of this study, a pricing model is regressed with can be illustrated as follows. Assume Ahmad has five
the final objective to compare mean predicted prices of children, three daughters and two sons. Let say, Lot 103
various land sub-types including ones that can closely which is 3 acres of prime farmland is the only major asset
reflect the Malay-owned smallholdings sector. left behind by Ahmad when he passed on. Table 1 shows
The  organization  of this paper is as follows. Section his beneficiaries’ respective claims on the land according
II discusses in greater detail the effect of land titling on to Fara’idh laws. 
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Table 1: Hypothetical Example: Fara’id Division of Lot 103 
Beneficiaries Share by Category Per person share Land size per person (Acres)
1 Wife 1/8 1/8 0.375
3 daughters 3/8 1/8 0.375
2 sons 4/8 2/8 0.75
The beneficiaries’ options regarding the land are as greater. In summary, Lot 103 remains intact, while all
follows: beneficiaries receive their share of their inheritance in
Keep the original lot intact, but have all their names of land-use status and so forth. 
and respective shares on the land registered at the
Land Office. Essentially, they are co-proprietors of From the above scenarios, it can be easily seen why
the land despite not having specific sub-plots drawn smallholdings such as Lot 103 above, are increasingly
for each person. The lot can be leased out and its converted from agricultural to developmental use (option
proceeds shared according to their shares in the land. (v)). Firstly, if the beneficiaries decide to sell the land, it is
If let say, one of the sons continues his late father’s better to sell the land as residential, commercial or
work on the land, he would have to share the income industrial property for its higher sales value. Secondly,
with the other beneficiaries after deducting expenses land conversion may be inevitable in cases where the
and reward for his efforts. partitioning  process  leads   to   resulting  agricultural
Negotiate for a settlement amongst them as to who sub-plots that are less than 0.4 acres. Non-agricultural
will inherit which asset, ideally to allow only one land can be partitioned or subdivided into any size up to
person per asset if the assets are of comparable the minimum allowable area determined by the local
values. The person receiving the land must either planning authority (usual conditions regarding access,
buy out land shares owned by others or swap his shape of land and infrastructure apply).
shares in other assets e.g. cash, for ownership of Prolonged delay in decision-making can also lead to
land. Note that any beneficiary can renounce his or land idling, despite the various built-in preventive
her claims on the land, although this is more often measures provided in the NLC to discourage this.
than not because the share is too insignificant or Sections 117 and 127 of the NLC allow States to initiate
troublesome to maintain. Thereafter, the remaining forfeiture proceedings on agricultural lands left idle
claimant will be registered as the sole owner. beyond a period of three years on grounds of a breach of
The beneficiaries can register their separate claims on the agricultural land-use conditions stated in the title.
the land, paving the way for partitioning to be However,  this  law  has  been  very   rarely  enforced
executed. The application must be initiated by the (none that we know of) possibly out of fear of adverse
person  with  the  largest  share  of  the  land,  which ballot-box reactions. Section 129(a)(b)(c) have even been
in  this  case  is  one  of  the  sons;  and  that  other amended to replace forfeiture with “temporary
co-owners consent to the proposed partitioning plan. possession” of the land so that the State can develop or
For agricultural land, the partition must not result in cultivate the land or invite a third party to do so. The
sub-lots that are less than 0.4 hectares. Since the wife landowner is exempted from financing the remedial work
and daughters inherit less than 0.4 hectares undertaken  on  the land in this situation. Nevertheless,
individually, they are forced to join as co-proprietors the incentives and legal threats have not proven effective
of one of the new sub-lots of land. in many instances. To demonstrate the challenges in
Sell the land, i.e. liquidate all claims on the land in reviving abandoned agricultural land with co-ownership
return for cash, which is then distributed according issues, we describe a case in Negeri Sembilan. In 2001, a
to the beneficiaries’ respective shares. They may pilot project to consolidate fragmented land through
engage a land broker to seek interested buyers who voluntary participation was launched by the Ministry of
want to buy the land on an “as is” basis. Agriculture in collaboration with the State government.
Alternatively, the beneficiaries can pool funds to The objective was to develop a 220 hectare tract of
convert the land into any of the development land contiguous smaller plots of abandoned farmland. The
category – an effort that can be worthwhile, since combined plots involved 180 owners. Despite the
price appreciation for this land type is generally extensive use of government machinery and local support,
cash net expenditures incurred to execute the change
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the process of obtaining landowners’ consent alone took PMR offers a valuable natural experiment opportunity to
more than three months to complete. Given the same test price gaps between different types of farmlands.
situation, it is hard to imagine a private agricultural Thirdly, errors and outliers are minimized because the data
investor being interested to embark on a similar land is already purged of non-competitive transfers such as:
consolidation project. If it is true that such lands have
difficulty in attracting public or private agricultural Land transfers between state and federal ministries or
investment, it follows that market valuation of the land agencies (lease or takings)
should be relatively lower compared to “single-owner” Nominal  price  or   zero-compensation   transfers
lands. This brings us to the following section where we (gifts of land or land-swap transactions). 
attempt to measure the shortfall in market value of land Related-party-transactions (i.e., transfers from parent
affected by “co-ownership” issues. The data and company to its subsidiaries or between associated
empirical model are explained in detail. companies).
Data and Methodology: If it is hypothesized that The empirical approach essentially involves two
complexities associated with co-ownership of land stages. In the first stage, we estimate a hedonic price
(brought about by estate-distribution) can cause the function (Rosen, 1974) in order to ascertain the marginal
land’s value to fall, then one feasible empirical strategy effect of separate land attributes. This approach is
would be to determine if there are indeed significant price adopted because for heterogeneous goods such as land,
differentials between co-owned land and single-owner the good’s price is dependent on the sum of values
land. Given Malaysia’s history, the most likely agricultural generated by the good’s attributes. The estimated
land sub-type to represent the former is the paddy land, marginal effects of each land attribute are then used in the
being the type of land-use most closely associated with second-stage analysis to predict mean price of various
the Muslim-Malay traditional economy. We also include sub-types of land, when a set of land attributes are held
vacant land since co-ownership impasse in many constant. Price comparisons between the land sub-types
instances leads to underutilization of land. On the other can then be made thereafter. 
hand, agricultural lands cultivated with rubber and oil
palm are usually run or owned by a single entity (either Hedonic Price Model: In agricultural economics, hedonic
private plantations or government’s agrarian agency), pricing model has been employed to measure values
hence are more suitably slotted in the single-owner contributed by different attributes of land either extant or
classification.  To  this  classification, we add one final emerging following the introduction of exogenous factors.
sub-type which is farmland with clear development i.e. For instance, the model has been extensively used to
non-agricultural potential. examine the effect of urban sprawl (Shonkwiler and
The dataset comprise actual land sales data (n= 2222) Reynolds, 1986; Bockstael, 1996; Shi, Phipps and Coyler,
of the above five types of farmland in four states in the 1997; Hardie, Narayan and Gardner, 2001; Towe,
Central West coast of Peninsular Malaysia during a Nickerson and Bockstael, 2005; Madisson, 2008); climatic
period of 7 years i.e., between 2001 and 2007. The four change (Madisson, 2000), tax on land (Hushak and Sadr,
states, Selangor, Perak, Negri Sembilan and Malacca are 1979; Pardew, 1986), soil quality (Oltmans, Chicoine and
selected because of their relatively higher growth rates of Scott, 1988; Palmquist and Danielson, 1989; Roka and
non-agricultural investment and population compared to Palmquist, 1997; Huang et al., 2006) on land overall values.
the rest of the country. Land sales data of total 27 districts The general hedonic price model adopts a non-linear
in the states are obtained from annual issues of the transcendental price function written as 
Property Market Report (PMR). Geographic Information
System (GIS) and Population Census data are used to (Eq. 1)
augment the basic dataset. For Malaysia, we find that
PMR has greater advantages over other data sources and
as a whole is fairly comparable to equivalent US and where the model contains k = 1,2,3,...,l continuous
Canadian land sale databases for a number of reasons. variables and n = 1,2,3,...,m dummy variables representing
Firstly, it allows the use of actual price paid as the different attributes of the i  land parcel; and are the
dependent variable. Secondly, because of its latitude, with vectors of regression coefficients and  is a vector of error
respect to land types, time and geographical coverage, the terms presumed to have a multivariate normal distribution,
th
k n
1 2 3 4
5 6 7
log
7
P rdfront gsa mrl popgro
lpopden ldistown year
= + + + + +
+ + +
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Table 2: Data Description and Summary Statistics: Full Sample (n=2222)
Variable Description Mean Std Deviation Min Max
Rprice Sale Value per hectare (in RM) in 2000 prices 106,028 146,490 4,753 1,254,197
Rdfront 1=Parcel with Road Frontage; 0=otherwise 0.202 0.402 0 1
Distown Euclidian distance to nearest town (in km) 40.54 24.32 1.81 126.62
Distnse Euclidian distance to nearest NSE interchange (km) 21.29 18.02 0.48 83.42
Popden District’s population density based on 2000 Census 228.78 303.61 13.09 2516.08
Popgro Annualised district population growth based on 1991 & 2000 Census (in %) 1.96 2.66 -0.41 13.47
Gsa If located in Group Settlement Schemes, then gsa=1; otherwise=0 0.22 0.42 0 1
Mrl If located in Malay Reserve Land areas, then mrl=1; otherwise=0 0.22 0.41 0 1
Dev If possesses development potential=1; otherwise =0 0.22 0.42 0 1
Oil palm If planted with oil palm trees=1; otherwise =0 0.27 0.44 0 1
Paddy If planted with rice=1; otherwise=0 0.05 0.23 0 1
Rubber If planted with rubber trees=1; otherwise=0 0.36 0.48 0 1
Vacant If not cultivated=1; otherwise =0 0.31 0.46 0 1
N(0, I). Variable definition and descriptive statistics are popgro and population density, popden, which reflects2
provided in Table 2. The dependent variable in the model urbanisation pressures, are both hypothesised to be
is Real Price per hectare of land in Ringgit Malaysia (RM), positively associated with land price. Five dummy
rprice. Land attributes considered able to affect value of variables are used to indicate the sub-type of each land
land and for which data are available are road frontage or sales observation: development, rubber, oil palm, paddy
access, land restrictions, proximity to urban centre and and vacant. All the land-potential dummies are introduced
demographic trends. Road frontage, rdfnt, is in the additive and multiplicative forms to determine
hypothesised to give positive value to parcel price, structural stability across the dataset [11].
irrespective of parcel’s sub-type. If a parcel is under any Because the data came from a number of years, we
land-transfer or land-use constraint, the relevant performed several tests for time effect, even after
restriction  dummy  variables will take the value of one. adjusting all price data for inflation. Price is found to be,
The restrictions tested are (i) Malay Reserve Land, mrl, to a large extent, stable throughout the study period,
introduced by the state authorities to disallow land in except in 2007. In other words, time trend is still present
designated Malay-majority areas from being transferred to despite using CPI-adjusted prices and that the trend is
non-Malay buyers and (ii) land under agrarian reform most obvious for 2007. Preliminary regressions showed
schemes established under Group Settlement Act (1960), that distance from a parcel to the nearest NSE
gsa. Proximity of the land parcel to the nearest town area, interchange, distnse, is not significant in determining
distown, is expected to be positively related to unit price price.
of  land.  The  significance  of this variable is multi-fold. For hedonic models, uncertainty regarding the
To agricultural buyers, it represents ease and cost of appropriate functional forms of the relationships is
access  to  market for their agricultural input and output. usually resolved either by comparing performance of a
To non-agricutural buyers, the distance variables standard model in various functional specifications
represent locational advantage, with regards to social (Halvorsen  and  Pollakowski, 1981; and Linneman, 1980)
amenities – administrative, recreation and economic – that or by applying statistical methods like the Box-Cox
proximity to an urban area brings. Distance from a parcel procedure. Application of the latter to our data supports
to the nearest NSE interchange, distnse, is expected to be a double-log specification in which both the dependent
important in a similar way although for slightly different and continuous explanatory variables enter the model in
reasons. NSE is the main route for transporting natural logarithms. This gives rise to the final form of the
commodities for markets in another state or to Thailand or model that is estimated:
Singapore, as well as for shipment through Penang, Port
Klang or Singapore international ports; NSE is also used
by many residing in rural areas to commute to work in the
larger towns or cities. Demographic information shed light
on changes occurring in the surrounding areas of a parcel Mean Price Prediction: Using the estimated model, the
and is often employed to signal non-agricultural demands conditional mean price per unit of land is predicted for
on the existing overall supply of land. Population growth, each  land  type.  Because  the  dependent  variable  - land
[log( )] log( [ ])E P E P≠
2ˆ ˆ ˆexp[log ] x exp[ / 2]i iP P=
2ˆ
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price - is expressed in natural logs, the predicted land held in Malay interests, compared to gsa which explicitly
values needs to be exponentiated to obtain predictions in blocks non-agricultural use and outsider interests in the
terms of real prices (RM per hectare). The mean of land.
predicted log of price is not the log of the mean of In the second stage analysis, we use estimated
predicted prices, i.e. . Instead, predicted coefficients from the hedonic price regression to predict
mean values should only be obtained using the following mean prices of a hypothetical baseline parcel for farmland
adjustment, of different land sub-types. The baseline parcel of land is
additional restrictions (gsa = 0 and mrl = 0), is located at
where  is the estimated variance of the residuals. The sample mean of ldistown and in a district with the median
expected price of the baseline parcel in each of the five observed popgro and lpopden values. The baseline
land sub-types can then be compared to each other[12]. values for popgro, lpopden and ldistown are1.44%,
RESULTS Table 4 compares the mean predicted baseline price
Since the purpose of the first phase is to identify baseline parcel is RM68,413; paddy, RM44,796; rubber,
separate  price  functions for different agricultural land RM52,631 and a vacant baseline parcel costs RM49,558.
sub-types, the dummies are interacted with all land The predicted price for an average baseline parcel with
attributes (independent variables) in the basic model. development potential is RM229,297, which means that
Results of the regression are shown in Table 3. The there is on average a substantial net premium of
reference land sub-type is oilpalm. Goodness of fit RM175,447 over the average predicted price of land
measure is 0.73, which is high given the cross-sectional without development potential. The mean predicted prices
nature of the data. The model’s null hypotheses regarding are all higher than the respective average prices in the
homoscedasticity (  = 4.10) and normality of residuals sample except for developable and vacant land [14].2
tests (  = 6.24) cannot be rejected at the 5% significance Predicted mean price for land with paddy potential is2
level. The correlation coefficient between actual and fitted the lowest in all five groups at RM44,796. Although data
values of land price (in RM) is 0.8073, which is quite on size of land parcels are not available (hence its effect
satisfactory. is not measured in the model), agricultural census and
The signs and significance of the coefficients reports have consistently shown that landholdings in the
generally conformed to our expectations. Specifically, paddy sub-sector is typically small. The phenomenon may
road-frontage is positively related to agricultural land be contributed by the nature of inter-generational asset
prices in all sub-types. The effect is strong, increasing the transfers in the past. Coupled with weak profit margins
value of the property by between 27 and 49% per hectare. from rice cultivation in Malaysia, paddy land prices are
Results also confirm the positive effect of demographic inevitably lower than that for other types of land.
factors on land prices. Estimates suggest that a unit Landowners have to rely heavily on government’s
percentage point increase in population growth (from say incentives  to  enhance  income  from  rice  production.
2 to 3%) increases land prices by 7% in developable and The retail ceiling price of domestically-produced rice is
vacant land and by 21% for paddy land ceteris paribus. typically set lower than imported rice but does not exceed
As expected, the additional restrictions on use and a level by which ordinary people can afford to purchase
ownership of agricultural land in Group Settlement Areas it. Furthermore, the variety of rice planted in Malaysia is
and Malay Reserve Land severely reduce the value of mostly not considered premium or niche such as the
agricultural land. The effect of mrl on paddy land is the Indian basmathi or the Japanese rice varieties, hence the
smallest and  the only one that is insignificant. Price of demand for Malaysian rice is relatively elastic. Even
mrl-restricted  land  is  about  23%  cheaper  if  the  land though rice farmers get to purchase seeds and certain
has development potential. Land restriction appears to quality of fertilisers at government-subsidised prices, this
have an adverse effect on price, although only slightly. is rarely sufficient to help them since other costs of
The probable reason is because mrl does not restrict production (particularly for labour and machinery) are
development use of the land, only that the land must be neither  subsidised nor   passed   on   to   the  consumers.
defined as one without road frontage (rdfnt = 0), has no
a distance from a major city that is equivalent to the
5.044541 and 3.500646 respectively [13].
for each category of land. The predicted oil palm’s
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Table 3: Partial Elasticities from Interaction Model Estimation with Land’s Potential-Use Grouping
OilPalm Rice Rubber Vacant Developable
--------------------------- ------------------------------ ----------------------------- ------------------------------ -----------------------------
Robust Robust Robust Robust Robust
Parameter Standard Parameter Standard Parameter Standard Parameter Standard Parameter Standard
Variable Estimate Errors Estimate, Errors Estimate, Errors Estimate, Errors Estimate, Errorsk k k k
Dev -0.70*** (0.168)
Rice 0.24 (0.775)
Rubber -0.77 (0.413)
Vacant -0.28*** (0.075)
Constant 10.81*** (0.304)
Rdfnt 0.35*** (0.061) 0.44** (0.164) 0.49*** (0.047) 0.41*** (0.072) 0.27*** (0.048)
Gsa -0.20*** (0.056) -0.06 (0.089) -0.10* (0.044) -0.27*** (0.075) -0.70*** (0.167)
Mrl -0.36*** (0.075) -0.07 (0.073) -0.13** (0.045) -0.13* (0.055) -0.26*** (0.051)
Popgro 0.13*** (0.028) 0.21*** (0.033) 0.13*** (0.025) 0.07*** (0.009) 0.07*** (0.007)
Lp.opden 0.12** (0.042) -0.02 (0.102) 0.16*** (0.032) 0.15*** (0.030) 0.13*** (0.034)
Ldistown -0.20*** (0.057) -0.19* (0.086) -0.09 (0.049) -0.16*** (0.050) 0.09* (0.039)
Year7 -0.15** (0.052) 0.01 (0.103) -0.13* (0.052) -0.19*** (0.056) -0.31*** (0.069)
Observations 2222
R 0.73872
Adj. R 0.73312
Breusch-Pagan 4.10 (p-value = 0.0430)2
Jacques-Bera 6.236 (p-value=0.0442)2
Dependent variable is log of real price per hectare. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05)
Table 4: Comparison of Mean Price and Predicted Baseline Price by Land-Use Potential
Category of Land by Land-use Potential Predicted Baseline Parcel Price per unit (RM) Mean Price per Unit (RM)
Developable 229,297 328,827
Oil palm 62,254 54,365
Rubber 52,631 48,466
Vacant 49,558 50,985
Rice 44,796 36,361
Compared to their European or North American market when adverse margins persist (particularly when
counterparts, there are no direct support or easement alternative income opportunities are now abundant in the
payments to landowners on account of their paddy land newer economic sectors[16]
holdings,  therefore  none can be capitalised into price. The paper describes how complex co-ownership
The combination of above-mentioned economic and issues can lead to uneconomic farm sizes or sometimes
structural characteristics of the paddy land causes it to be prevent farming activities altogether (through land-use
unattractive to buyers [15]. conversion or land abandonment). Complexities in dealing
The second lowest predicted baseline parcel price with ‘problematic’ landholdings have the effect of
belongs to vacant land at RM49,558. Recall that the creating individual inertia that prevents farmers and
vacant  category  is  largely  made up of agricultural investors from transacting as much of the land as they
parcels with very little development potential, which would like in that period or even forever; ultimately
means that their speculative values can be assumed jeopardizing the market’s function to reallocate land
limited. Co-ownership issues may force the affected land efficiently. Landowners may be forced to release their land
to be left uncultivated and sold at lower than competitive earlier than necessary to ‘unload’ problematic holdings
prices. Continuous land fragmentation particularly on and move on. On the other hand, buyers may refrain from
marginal lands usually entails very little surplus problematic land parcels even if it is economically sized if
accumulation for productivity improvements or crop they expect substantial delay and complications in
substitution in the future. Smallholders are particularly securing full rights to the land. As a result, the market may
vulnerable to shocks in the input and output market and be saturated with many landowners of small parcels of
thus are more likely to abandon their land or sell to the land  willing  and  eager  to  sell  their  land  relative  to the
Middle-East J. Sci. Res., 21 (9): 1561-1569, 2014
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number of buyers wanting the lands. Evidence from our owe each other a duty of care and not let financial motives
empirical exercise shows that mean price of paddy and override all consideration. Another issue that is seldom
vacant land are indeed far below the mean price of like-to- considered is whether the effect of land distribution could
like parcels in other sub-types of land less vulnerable to lead to deterioration, if not complete destruction, of the
co-ownership and fragmentation risks. For instance a land’s economic value in the long term. In other words,
paddy parcel is valued 28% cheaper than an oil palm the sum of the value received from selling their
parcel with exact same attributes; while a vacant parcel is inheritances today could be smaller than the future value
valued 20% cheaper. Despite the numerous economic and of the land if kept fully intact and productive (hence the
non-economic factors that can also explain the relatively oft-quoted plea for families to share the benefits of
lower prices for paddy and vacant land, the effects of inherited  land  rather  than  the  physical land). Maqasid
continuous  fragmentation  and  co-ownership disputes al-Shariah demands that the income-generating value of
cannot be ignored. any maal to be protected at all costs and this includes
In any estate-distribution process, it is fundamental preserving its optimum size and ensuring that either (i) the
to recognize that assets which are fixed and economically person most efficient (to maximize return) or (ii) the most
size-sensitive should be preserved intact as far as in need (to maximize welfare) is using the land. It is
possible. Furthermore, the person owning or operating the imperative that the society recognizes that failure to
land should ideally be the one most suited to the task or maximize land’s benefits to the beneficiaries is akin to
most needful of the land to earn his living. A Muslim must carelessly leaving the family destitute in regards to future
be responsible about how he is going to leave his family income[17].
after his demise. Proper estate planning is vital to ensure In estate-distribution consultations, the family
that no one in the family is left financially deprived after members may want to consider other Islamic provisions
the passing of a person, yet, ‘planning for death’ is still a for example, hibah (gifts before death), takharruj
taboo subject for most people. Furthermore, many (voluntary withdrawal of claims), thawab (reward or
Muslims  are  of  the  impression that Fara’id is the first compensation) and wassiyyah (bequests), all of which
and sole method of distribution when it is actually not. can be used with hikmah and spirit of ihsaan to maintain
The  spirit  of  the  Quran  with respect to the matter is the principle of ‘adl to all beneficiaries and prevent fixed
well-embodied in the very verses preceding the Fara’idh economic  assets  such  as  land from excessive division.
injunctions, in particular, It includes taking into account differences in the
“Let those (disposing of an estate) have the same economic position of the individual beneficiaries. A
fear in their minds as they would have for their own if they wealthy beneficiary may be persuaded to transfer their
had left a helpless family behind; let them fear Allah and rights on the land to others less financially steady or who
speak appropriate words.” is fully dependent on income from utilizing the land. In the
Surah An-Nisaa’:9 allocate a portion of the land, subject to certain
Consultations between family members with or not mentioned in the will. In short, there is ample room for
without the presence of an arbitrator should be carried out deliberation and adjustments with regards to estate-
in a positive way with the sole aim of realizing the spirit of distribution, even within the framework of fara’idh and
the Farai’dh law, which is to ensure that the beneficiaries, wasiyyah systems. The Muslim inheritance system is
both women and men, are given their due shares in a way neither flawed nor inadequate; instead it is extremely vast
that would maximize the well-being and ensure that no one and able to accommodate all types of circumstances.
would be worse off in the short or long run. However in Problems, if any, lies in its narrow application and in the
practice, to avoid extended family disputes, many families fallibility of human nature. Greed and jealousy should not
have taken to selling the land, sometimes below the override the spirit of fairness and generosity that are
prevailing market prices for similar parcels, not unlike encouraged in Islam. Otherwise, Muslims in Malaysia may
‘distress  sale’  often  associated  with  cash-strapped not see the end of problems generated by uneconomic
land-owners. There are many occasions on which the land land sizes and farm operations, conversion of agricultural
is sold even though people, whom may include any land to other uses (and hence, the subsequent decline of
number of beneficiaries, are forced to move out from their food production capabilities of the country as a whole)
homes or terminate their farming activities. This runs very and ultimately, the overall erosion of Malay-Muslim land
much against the principle of ukhuwwah, where Muslims ownership and economic wealth.
same manner, the Shari’ah allows the beneficiaries to
conditions, to a non-beneficiary individual or institution
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CONCLUSION 7. National Land Code, Malayan Law Journal, 1965: 1:
A wealthy beneficiary may be persuaded to transfer 8. Pazim Othman, 1992. Land-Abandonment in the Rice
their rights  on  the land to others less financially steady Sector in West Malaysia, Malaysian Journal of
or who is fully dependent on income from utilizing the Economic Studies, 29(1): 51-68.
land. In the same manner, the Shari’ah allows the 9. Pazim Othman, 1997. The Position of Idle land in
beneficiaries to allocate a portion of the land, subject to Malaysia, paper presented at CAP National
certain conditions, to a non-beneficiary individual or Conference on Land, Emerging Issues & Challenges,
institution not mentioned in the will. 12-15 December 1997, Pulau Pinang.
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